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COMMENT 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND 
THE CALIFORNIA INITIA TIVE 
But what's one crocodile's tooth, more or less? 
-Shel Silverstein, The Crocodile's Toothache 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2005, the voters of California went to the polls for a 
special election called by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. I The 
Governor called the election so the people of the state could vote on a 
quartet of initiatives on a range of topics to "reform" California 
government.2 The proposed initiatives addressed state spending limits, 
redistricting, use of union dues for political purposes, and teacher 
tenure.3 
The Public Policy Institute of California released a survey on 
October 28, 2005, that measured the attitudes of likely voters on a variety 
of topics, including the impending special election.4 Fifty-four percent 
of likely voters thought it was a bad idea.s In addition, none of the 
Governor's "reform" initiatives enjoyed the support of a majority of the 
likely voters that participated in the survey.6 The survey, released two 
weeks before the election, proved accurate. The voters of California 
I See John Wildemuth and Carla Marinucci, 6.8 Million Expected to Vote Today, S.F. 
Chronicle, November 8, 2005, at AI. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 Public Policy Institute of California, Special Survey On Californians and the Initiative 
Process 7 (2005), available at http://www.ppic.org/mainlpublication.asp?i=641 (last visited 
February 10, 2006). The Public Policy Institute of California is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research 
organization that is dedicated to improving public policy in the state. See 
http://www.ppic.org/mainlabout.asp (last visited February 10,2006). 
sId. at 38. 
6 See id. at 32-33. 
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rejected all of the Governor's proposed initiatives.7 
Interestingly, ambivalence toward the issues themselves does not 
appear to be the source of the initiatives' defeat.8 The survey revealed 
that voters are indeed concerned about the problems that the Governor's 
proposed initiatives were meant to address.9 For instance, even though a 
majority of likely voters opposed the Governor's redistricting initiative, 
forty-four percent of those asked felt that California's redistricting 
process needs major changes. lO Similarly, sixty-two percent of likely 
voters opposed the initiative dealing with state spending limits despite 
the fact that sixty-six percent of those same voters believed that major 
changes are needed in the way California spends its money. II 
Taken together, the results of the survey and the special election 
suggest that the voters of California simply did not think that the 
initiative process was an appropriate means for dealing with these 
issues. 12 Indeed, the Governor himself seems to have conceded this 
point; after the election his spokesman claimed that the people of 
California had voted against the election itself rather than against the 
Governor's ideas.13 The spokesman went on to say that "the governor 
very much sees the results as an indication that voters want the problems 
of the state to be resolved here in Sacramento by elected officials.,,14 
The special election of 2005 was the latest act in a constitutional 
drama that has been unfolding for the last 94 years lS and that will 
continue to unfold as an integral part of California's future. Since the 
advent of the initiative process in California, it has played a key role in 
the state's legal and political saga, performing its part alongside the 
state's other three constitutional actors-the legislature, the executive, 
and the judiciary. 
Recognition of this key role has prompted many to refer to the 
initiative process in California as a fourth branch of government. 16 
7 Mark Martin, Carla Marinucci, and Lynda Gledhill, Californians Say No to 
Schwarzenegger S.F. Chron. November 9,2005, at AI. 
8 See Public Policy Institute of California, supra note 4 at v. 
9 See id. 
IO Public Policy Institute of California, supra note 4 at 33. 
Illd. 
12 See id. at 38. 
13 John Wildemuth and Carla Marinucci, Governor's Camp Says His Ideas Didn't Lose, S.F. 
Chron., November 10,2005, at AI. 
14 1d. 
15 The initiative process was created in 1911 by an amendment to the state constitution. See 
infra part n.B. 
16 See John M. Allswang, Initiative & Referendum in California, 1898-1998 1 (2000); see 
also Peter Schrag, The Fourth Branch o/Government? You Bet., 41 SANTA CLARA L REv. 937, 941 
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However, the theoretical implications of this claim remain largely 
unexplored. 17 One reason for this is that the state separation of powers 
concerns that are implicated by the naming of the initiative power as a 
fourth branch of government have not received anywhere near the same 
level of scholarly attention that federal separation of powers issues have 
received. 18 
This Comment seeks to apply the existing principles of California's 
separation of powers jurisprudence to the statutory initiative power, 
beginning from the premise that this power constitutes a fourth and 
autonomous branch of government. Part I describes the initiative process 
and how it differs from the manner in which laws are passed by the 
legislature. 19 Part II details the theoretical and historical origins of the 
initiative power?O Part III identifies the sources of the initiative power 
and the conventional legislative process, and it discusses the differing 
places ascribed to each in the state's constitutional jurisprudence.21 Part 
IV delineates the existing limits on the initiative power.22 Part V 
identifies the salient principles of the separation of powers in 
California.23 Part VI argues that the lack of a legislative check on the 
initiative power allows the initiative to completely subsume the state's 
legislative power, which was not the intent when the initiative power was 
created.24 Part VII concludes that the state legislature should play a 
meaningful role in the initiative process in order to avoid a conflict with 
the separation of powers provision in the state constitution?5 
I. THE INInA nVE PROCESS 
The initiative process allows the voters of California (whom the 
state constitution terms "the electors .. 26) to adopt statutes and 
(2001); Gerald F. Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives After 
Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 999, 999 (2001). 
17 Cf Karl Manheim and Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in 
California, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 116S, 1166 (1998). 
18 See Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's Separation of 
Powers,SI UCLAL.REV. 1079,1082(2004). 
19 See infra notes 26-74 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 7S-124 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 12S-1S7 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes IS8-201 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 202-267 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 268-293 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 294-308 and accompanying text. 
26 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8. 
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constitutional amendments independently of the state legislature.27 
Whereas laws enacted by the legislature must travel a long and 
complicated path that is often, in the words of one legislator, "difficult 
and tortuOUS,,,28 laws enacted by the voters take effect through a 
relatively simple procedure of signature-gathering, campaigning, and 
finally a popular vote?9 Initiated laws are thus spared the arduous 
vetting and amendment processes that legislatively enacted laws must 
undergo.3D These legislative processes allow for a great deal of "critical 
shaping" by interested parties on both sides of the partisan aisle?l The 
initiative process does not.32 
A. How A BILL BECOMES ALA W 
The journey of a law passed by the state legislature begins when a 
legislator decides that a certain change that is needed to statutory law or 
to the state constitution?3 The author then submits the idea to the Office 
of the Legislative Counsel, which drafts the actual bill that ostensibly 
will enact the proposed change?4 Bill in hand, the author consults with 
staff, agencies, advocates, and other organizations to ensure that the bill 
contains appropriate language. 35 
After the author has completed this first round of vetting, the bill 
receives a number and goes immediately to the Rules Committee.36 The 
Rules Committee assigns the bill to the appropriate policy committee 
based on the bill's subject matter.37 The staff of the policy committee, 
alongside the author's staff, then analyzes the bill to identify any flaws it 
might have and to recommend appropriate changes.38 Once this analysis 
is complete, the committee holds a hearing on the bill, at which it listens 
to testimony both for and against the bill and asks whatever questions it 
may have.39 
27 See id.; see also id. art. XVill. §§ 3-4. 
28 Sheila James Kuehl, Either Way You Get Sausages: One Legislator'S View of the Initiative 
Process, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1327,1327 (1998). 
29 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8. 
30 See Keuhl, supra note 28 at 1329. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1327. 
34 Id. 
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If the bill clears the first policy committee, it may then go to a 
second policy committee where the analysis and hearing processes are 
repeated.4o A bill that is fiscal-meaning that its implementation will 
cost the state money-is sent to the Appropriations Committee which 
assesses the impact of that COSt.41 If the Appropriations Committee is 
satisfied, the bill goes to the Floor of the Assembly or Senate (depending 
on which house originates the bill) where further analysis, debate, and 
possible amendments occur.42 Once the bill clears the Floor, it then goes 
to the other house where the entire process begins again.43 
The Assembly and the Senate consider a bill for six months, during 
which time the bill is "poked, prodded, questioned, discussed, debated, 
and scrutinized.,,44 At any point along the way, the bill's journey to the 
statute books or the constitution may be permanently halted.45 If a bill 
survives passage through both houses of the legislature, it goes to the 
governor's desk to be either vetoed or signed into law.46 If the bill is a 
proposed constitutional amendment, it must overcome the final obstacle 
of a popular vote before it is adopted.47 
B. How To PASS A LAW WITHOUT LEGISLATORS 
Though it accomplishes the same result as the conventional 
legislative process-the adoption of a law or constitutional 
amendment-the initiative process does so in a very different fashion.48 
The California Constitution provides that a proposed initiative may be 
placed on the ballot by presenting a petition to the Secretary of State 
containing the text of the proposed law and a requisite number of 
signatures.49 The California Elections Code sets out the specific 
procedural requirements with which the initiative proponents must 
comply if the desired law is to arrive safely on the ballot.50 
The initiative process begins when a proponent drafts a proposed 
law.51 The proponent may request the assistance of the Legislative 
40 [d. 
41 See id. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. 
44 [d. at 1329. 
45 See id. 
46 !d. 
47 [d. 
48 See id. 
49 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(b). 
50 See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9000 et seq. (West 2005). 
51 California Secretary of State Initiative Guide (2002), 
5
Tipps: Separation of Powers - California Politics
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
190 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
Counsel in drafting the law but is not required to do SO.52 Once the text 
of the law is complete, the proponent submits it to the Attorney General 
who prepares a title and summary. 53 The initiative proponent may make 
substantive amendments to the law for only fifteen days after 
submission.54 In addition, if the Attorney General decides that the 
proposed law requires a fiscal analysis, the Department of Finance and 
the Joint Legislative Budget Committee must prepare the analysis within 
twenty-five working days of receiving the proposed law.55 
After the proponent has received the official title and summary from 
the Attorney General, the petition circulation process can begin.56 The 
proponent must collect the required number of signatures within a 150-
day period. 57 In addition, the initiative must qualify for the ballot at least 
131 days before the election in which it will be voted on.58 Once the 
signature-gathering process is complete, the petition is filed with the 
appropriate local elections officials.59 These officials then perform a raw 
count of the signatures on the petition and report the number to the 
Secretary of State.60 If less than 100 percent of the required number is 
present, the measure immediately fails.61 If more than 100 percent of the 
required number is present, the Secretary of State directs the local 
officials to perform a random sample to determine the validity of the 
signatures.62 The measure qualifies for the ballot once the Secretary of 
State is satisfied that the petition contains the required number of valid 
signatures.63 
Because the qualification process is somewhat technical and time-
sensitive, many initiative proponents employ the services of professional 
signature-gathering firms. 64 By paying these firms on a per-signature 
basis, initiative proponents can overcome much of the difficulty involved 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/e1ections/init~ide.htm (last visited January 29, 2006). 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 9004 (West 2005). 








63 See id. 
64 Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Democracy? 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 20 
(1997). 
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in the qualification process.65 These firms are part of what has come to 
be called "the initiative industry.,,66 This term encompasses not only 
firms that gather signatures, but also those that draft the proposed law 
and perform media consulting services during the campaign for the law's 
passage.67 However, despite the availability of for-profit signature-
gathering firms, most measures fail to surmount the obstacles to ballot 
qualification.68 
Whereas laws passed by the legislature are subject to input, vetting, 
and amendment from a variety of sources, laws passed by initiative 
remain in substantially the same form throughout the process.69 
Currently no procedures exist by which to test and weigh the legal 
sufficiency or constitutionality of proposed initiatives before they are 
placed on the ballot.70 The role of the Attorney General is expressly 
limited to the preparation of a title and summary of the proposed law.7l 
The Legislative Counsel has a role in the initiative process only if the 
Attorney General happens to be a proponent of an initiative; if this is the 
case, it takes over the duties normally performed by the Attorney 
General.72 Even though the Senate and the Assembly may hold hearings 
on proposed initiatives, neither body has authority to alter the text of an 
initiative in any way.73 Initiatives are thus presented to voters on a take-
it-or-Ieave-it basis with language chosen exclusively by the proponent.74 
II. THE INITIATIVE As THE OPPOSITE OF REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 
The practical difference between the initiative process and the 
conventional legislative process results from a difference in theory. The 
initiative process is a form of direct democracy, which allows citizens to 
directly exercise lawmaking power.75 Direct democracy differs 
fundamentally from the representative form of government that is 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. at 20. 
68 [d. at 19. 
69 Kuehl. supra note 28 at 1329. 
70 See Philip P. Frickey. The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct 
Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 421, 438 (1998). 
71 See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9002 et seq. (West 2005). 
72 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9003 (West 2005). 
73 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9007 (West 2005). 
74 Kuehl, supra note 28 at 1329. 
75 See Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. I. 1503, 1509 (1990). 
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generally associated with the American system.76 Whereas 
representative government was designed in large part to curb the tyranny 
of the majority through the "filtering" of majoritarian preferences,77 
direct democracy is meant to fully and unreservedly implement the 
popular will.78 Even though the U.S. Constitution does not provide for 
the exercise of direct democracy, California has followed a different path 
by placing direct lawmaking power in the hands of its citizens.79 
A. THE FRAMERS' REJECTION OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution expressed a preference for 
representative government over and against direct democracy by severely 
curtailing citizens' participation in the lawmaking process.80 The 
original U.S. Constitution granted the people no direct lawmaking 
power.81 In addition, the provisions that established the Electoral College 
system82 and that provided for the election of U.S. Senators by the state 
legislatures83 substantially limited the ability of citizens to choose their 
elected representatives.84 Under the original system, the citizens of the 
United States could elect only the members of the House of 
Representatives by means of a direct vote.85 
The underlying reasons for this rejection of direct democracy 
derived from concerns regarding the threat of "factions" and the tyranny 
of the majority.86 "Faction," in the words ofJames Madison, refers to 
a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
76 See Marci Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 1,4-10 (1997). 
77 Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency 
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 V AND. L. REV. 395,401-02 (2003); Frickey, supra note 71 at 425-
26. 
1166. 
78 See Eule, supra note 75 at 1513. 
79 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a). 
80 See Frickey, supra note 70 at 423-25; see also Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 
81 Hamilton, supra note 76 at 7. 
82 U.S. CONST. art. II. § 1. 
83 U.S. CONST. art. I. § 3. 
84 See Frickey, supra note 70 at 424. 
85 See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 2. 
86 See Frickey, supra note 70 at 424-425. 
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d . f h . 87 pennanent an aggregate mterests 0 t e commUnIty. 
Madison's fellow revolutionary Alexander Hamilton aptly summarized 
the threat posed by factions and what should be done about it: 
Men love power .... Give all power to the many, they will oppress 
the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both 
therefore ought to have power, that each may defend itself against the 
other. 88 
According to Madison, representative government accomplishes this 
objective because it 
refiners] and enlargers] public views, by passing them through the 
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern 
the true interest of our country, and whose patriotism and love of 
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial 
considerations.89 
Citizen participation in government was originally limited to the 
election of representative lawmakers and the President.90 However, the 
operation of the electoral college and the choosing of senators by the 
state legislatures mediated citizens' exercise of this election power.91 As 
a result of this inherent distrust of direct citizen participation in 
government, the view that the framers would look upon direct citizen 
lawmaking "with a feeling akin to horror" finds substantial support in 
both the text and history ofthe U.S. Constitution.92 
B. THE HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA 
Even though the U.S. Constitution does not provide for direct 
democracy, many states-California included-have pursued an 
alternate course. Currently about half of the states allow for some form 
of direct democracy.93 Beginning in 1898 with South Dakota, a wave of 
state constitutional reforms precipitated by the Populist and Progressive 
87 [d. at 424. 
88 Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy 7 (1989). 
89 Frickey, supra note 70 at 425. 
90 /d. at 424. 
91 [d. 
92 Eu1e, supra note 75 at 1523. 
93 Frickey, supra note 70 at 426. 
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Movements swept through the western half of the country.94 By the time 
this wave retreated, it had deposited provisions for the exercise of direct 
democracy in the constitutions of many western states, including 
California.95 
The late nineteenth century was a time of rapid industrial growth 
and corresponding social change.96 In California during this time, the 
Southern Pacific Railroad had come to completely dominate politics and 
government.97 In the thirty years following the adoption of the 1879 
version of the state constitution, not a single bill opposed by the railroad 
company was passed in the legislature.98 
Eventually, a movement against the railroad's political monopoly 
took shape and began to groW.99 The core of this movement consisted of 
a group of Republican lawyers and merchants who were dissatisfied with 
the railroad's grip on power. 100 Through tireless effort, these 
Republicans eventually elected a reform-minded governor-Hiram 
Johnson-and a sympathetic legislature. 101 In 1911 Governor Hiram 
Johnson called a special election as a way of delivering on his promise to 
end the dominance of special interests in the state capital of 
Sacramento. 102 The result was the adoption of the initiative process in 
California, which has been subsequently hailed by a prominent justice of 
the California Supreme Court as "one of the outstanding achievements of 
the progressive movement of the early 1900s.,,103 
Regarding the purpose of the adoption of the initiative and 
referendum in California, Hiram Johnson, in his inaugural address, 
declared: 
And while I do not by any means believe the Initiative, the 
Referendum, and the Recall are the panacea for all our political ills, 
yet they do give the electorate the power of action when desired, and 
they do place in the hands of the People the means by which they may 
94 See Arne R. Leonard, In Search of the Deliberative Initiative: A Proposal for a New 
Method of Constitutional Change, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1203,1207 (1996). 
95 1d. 
96 See David. B. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution 5 (1989). 
97 See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1183. 
98 1d. 
99 See id. at II 85-86. 
100 Id. at 1186. 
WIld. 
IW ld. 
103 Id. at 1187. 
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104 protect themselves. 
Indeed, the ballot pamphlet that was circulated in support of the 1911 
amendment creating the initiative power stated 
[The initiative] is not intended and will not be a substitute for 
legislation, but will constitute that safeguard which the people should 
retain for themselves to supplement the work of the legislature by 
initiating those measures which the legislature either viciously or 
negligently fails or refuses to enact; and to hold the legislature in 
check, and to veto or negate such measures as it may viciously or 
negligently enact. 1 05 
From its inception, the initiative process in California has served as 
the people's check on their elected representatives. 106 The original 
understanding of the initiative's purpose envisioned it as a structural 
safeguard that would ensure that the people's ability to correct abuses of 
legislative power would remain intact. 107 However, it was not intended 
as a wholesale substitute for the state legislature. 108 
C. THE INITIATIVE TODAY 
From the time of its adoption, the California initiative has evolved 
from a means by which ordinary citizens may put a stop to unsavory or 
self-serving practices of the state legislature into another tool for well-
funded special interests to advance their agenda. 109 In particular, the 
advent of the "initiative industry" has placed the initiative at the disposal 
of the very special interest groups whose influence it was meant to 
curb. 11O Moreover, the initiative process has increasingly supplanted the 
state legislature in both enacting legislation and defining public policy. III 
For its part, the state's political apparatus has adapted itself to an 
environment where the initiative reigns supreme. I 12 Politicians have 
104 Donald S. Greenberg, Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CAL. L. 
REV. 1717, 1741 (1966). 
105 Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1188. 
106 Id. at 1169. 
107 /d. at 1188. 
108 1d. 
109 See id. at 1190. 
110 See David Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and 
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13,35-36 (1995); see also Schrag, supra note 16 at 940-
41. 
III See Frickey, supra note 70 at 429-30. 
112 See Uelmen, supra note 16 at 999. 
11
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begun to take on sponsorship roles for particular initiatives in the hopes 
that popular support for the ballot measure they sponsor will foster equal 
support for their campaign for elective office. 113 At the same time, 
legislators have displayed a tendency to avoid difficult questions of 
public policy, preferring to let such disputes resolve themselves on the 
initiative battleground.114 
Advocates of the initiative process justify the lack of procedural 
safeguards by simple appeal to the democratic ideal; they argue that 
citizens enacting laws on their own, without help from the legislature, is 
the essence of democracy. 115 Further, because legislatures are inherently 
susceptible to corruption and undue influence by special interests, the 
initiative process allows ordinary citizens to resolve pressing public 
issues with which the legislature has been unable or unwilling to deal. 116 
Critics of the initiative process argue that as a form of direct 
democracy it is inconsistent with the basic republican form of 
government enshrined in the Constitution of the United States and 
therefore is prohibited by the Guarantee Clause in Article IV. 117 Such 
critics also point out that the lack of an opportunity for deliberation and 
compromise in the initiative process poses a unique threat to the rights of 
politically unpopular minorities such as illegal immigrants, criminal 
defendants, and gays and lesbians. I 18 
Regardless of the merits of these arguments for and against, the 
initiative process in California has become a permanent part of the state's 
legal and political landscape. 119 Voters regard it as a way to include 
themselves in a legislative process that often seems unduly long and 
difficult. 120 As noted above, politicians find it useful as a tool for self-
marketing. 121 Well-financed special interests use it as an alternative 
means of advancing their agendas when the legislature is slow to act on 
113 See Magleby, supra note 110 at 29. 
114 See id.; see also Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000. 
115 See Schmidt, supra note 96 at vii-viii. 
116 See id. at 26. 
117 The Guarantee Clause, contained in art. IV § 4 of the U.S. Constitution, provides in 
pertinent part, ''The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican fonn of 
government." 
118 See Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 
41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1051 (2001); see also Craig B. Holman and Robert Stern, Judicial 
Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 
1239,1246 (1998). 
119 See Kuehl, supra note 28 at 1329. 
120 See id. 
121 See Magleby, supra note 110 at 29. 
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or is unresponsive to their needs. 122 Finally, grassroots citizen groups see 
it as the only available means to advocate for their issues when the 
legislature has both ears bent by the aforementioned special interests. '23 
The initiative process means many things to many people. 124 Its 
paramount role in California can hardly be disputed, yet its place within 
the state's constitutional structure has not been fully explored. Before 
attempting to place the initiative power alongside the other powers duly 
vested by the constitution in the other coordinate branches of 
government, that power and its existing limits must be defined. 
III. THE lNITIA TIVE POWER 
The ability of the citizens of California to propose and adopt their 
own statutes and constitutional amendments via the initiative process 
derives from a combination of two provisions in the state constitution. '25 
Article IV, section 1, vests the legislative power of the state "in the 
California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly," but 
goes on to provide that "the people reserve to themselves the powers of 
initiative and referendum.,,'26 Article II, section 8(a), defines this 
"reserved" power of initiative as "the power of the electors to propose 
statutes and amendments to the constitution and to adopt or reject 
them."I27 
Construing the language of article IV, section 1, California courts 
have treated the people's statutory initiative power as co-extensive with 
that of the legislature. 128 In other words, it is a form of legislative 
power. 129 Even though the initiative process and the conventional 
legislative process are two forms of the same constitutional power, the 
two differ significantly in terms of the place occupied by each in the 
state's constitutional jurisprudence. 130 
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW As THE SOLE CHECK ON THE INITIATIVE POWER 
Once a bill passes both houses of the legislature, it must be 
122 Frickey, supra note 70 at 432. 
123 See Schmidt, supra note 96 at 30. 
124 See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
125 See CAL. CONST. art. N. § 1; see also Cal. Const. art. II § 8(a). 
126 CAL. CONST. art. N. § 1. 
127 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a). 
128 See, e.g. Santa Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 902 P.2d 225, 246 (Cal. 
1995). 
129 See id. 
130 See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1202. 
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presented to the governor for signature or veto. 131 This requirement 
constitutes an important check on the legislative power as it is exercised 
by the state's body of elected representatives. 132 Indeed, presentment is a 
function of the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of 
powers which serves to guard against an accumulation of governmental 
power in the hands of a single entity.133 In contrast, laws passed by 
initiative take effect automatically upon approval by the voters. 134 No 
presentment to the governor or the legislature is needed for a proposed 
initiative to become law once it has survived a popular vote. 135 
Moreover, a law enacted through the initiative process cannot be 
amended or repealed except through another popular vote. 136 If the 
legislature wishes to amend or repeal an initiated law, it must pass a 
statute that the voters must in tum approve. 137 The only exception occurs 
when the law itself allows for legislative amendment or repeal without 
the need for a popular vote. 138 
The inability on the part of the state legislature to amend or repeal 
initiated laws has led the California Supreme Court to conclude that in 
this connection the people's initiative power is superior to the state 
legislature's lawmaking power.139 Specifically, this superiority consists 
in the fact that whereas the legislature may not pass laws that bind future 
legislatures, laws passed through initiative may and do bind future 
legislatures because such legislatures are unable to amend or repeal those 
laws. 140 
The result of these differences is that judicial review is the only 
check on the legislative power as it is exercised by the people through 
the initiative process. 141 As noted above, the executive branch possesses 
no check on the initiative power because the state constitution does not 
require initiated laws to be presented to the governor for signature or 
veto. 142 Likewise, the state legislature possesses no check on the 
initiative power because it is powerless to amend or repeal initiated 
131 CAL. CONST. art. IV. § JO(a). 
132 See Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State, 20 P.3d 533, 539 (Cal. 2001). 
133 See id. 
134 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § JO(a}. 
135 See id. 
136 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § JO(e). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 574 (Cal. 1995). 
140 Id. 
141 See Richard B. Collins, How Democratic Are Initiatives? 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 983, 999 
(2001). 
142 See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. 
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laws,143 nor does it play any substantive role in the formulation and 
proposal of those laws. l44 Review by the judiciary stands alone as a 
method for keeping the people's exercise of the initiative power within 
the bounds prescribed for it by the state constitution. 145 
B. THE ISSUE OF DEFERENCE 
That judicial review is the sole check on the initiative power, given 
the absence of a presentment requirement or a legislative amendment or 
repeal power, might lead one to think that California courts closely 
scrutinize initiated laws when assessing their constitutionality, but often 
the opposite seems to be true. 146 All exercises of legislative power are 
entitled to a degree of judicial deference as a matter of comity between 
co-equal branches of government,147 but initiated laws appear to enjoy an 
even greater degree of deference than do laws passed by the state 
legislature. 148 In particular, while the courts strictly construe the 
constitutional limits on what the legislature may dO,149 they liberally 
construe the permissible uses of the initiative power. 150 
California courts have developed a tradition of employing highly 
deferential language in cases that involve legal challenges to initiatives. 
The following is a typical example: "it is our solemn duty 'to jealously 
guard' the initiative power, it being 'one of the most precious rights of 
our democratic process. ",lSI Another common passage is as follows: 
Although the legislative power under our state Constitution is vested 
in the Legislature, "the people reserve to themselves the powers of 
initiative and referendum." [Citation.] Accordingly, the initiative 
power must be liberally construed to promote the democratic 
process. 152 
Commentators have offered several explanations for this apparent 
143 See CAL. CONST. an. IV. § I. 
144 See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9003 (West 2005). 
145 See Collins, supra note 140 at 999. 
146 See Craig B. Holman and Robert Stern, supra note 118 at 1250. 
147 See Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d. 708, 722 (Cal. 1999). 
148 See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1217. 
149 Collins v. Riley, 152 P.2d 169, 171 (Cal. 1944). 
150 See Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 277 (Cal. 1982). 
151 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 
1302 (Cal. 1978). 
152 California Ass'n of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 236 (Ct. App. 
2003) (emphasis in original). 
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deference. 153 Perhaps the most convincing was put forth by Joseph 
Grodin, a former justice of the California Supreme Court, who compared 
deciding initiative cases to handling "hot potatoes" in that 
It is one thing for a court to tell a legislature that a statute it has 
adopted is unconstitutional; to tell that to the people of a state who 
have indicated their direct support for the measure through the ballot 
. h 154 
IS anot er. 
In other words, a main reason for judicial deference to initiatives is that 
justices of the California Supreme Court are subject to periodic retention 
elections. 155 As a result, justices that vote to invalidate laws passed by 
initiative face the possibility of electoral reprisal for their actions. 156 Otto 
Kaus, another former justice of the California Supreme Court once 
famously remarked on the dilemma facing a justice who must decide 
controversial cases while facing a popular election: "It is difficult to 
ignore a crocodile in your bathtub when you are shaving in the 
morning." 157 
This "crocodile in the bathtub" effect provides a convincing 
explanation for the courts' use of the aforementioned highly deferential 
language. The deference to initiated laws serves to insulate the state's 
judiciary from the threat of electoral reprisal. As such, the California 
judiciary's deference to initiatives must be interpreted as more rhetorical 
than substantive, for as the next section demonstrates, initiatives in fact 
possess no greater constitutional weight than conventional legislation. 
IV. LIMITS ON THE INITIATIVE POWER 
Notwithstanding the apparent deference accorded to initiated laws 
by California courts, by and large those courts have declined to elevate 
such laws to a privileged constitutional status. 158 Instead, they have 
enforced the constitutional limitations on the initiative power in as 
straightforward a manner as they enforce the limits on what the state 
legislature may dO. 159 The single-subject requirement and the 
requirement of overall constitutionality each derive from an even-handed 
153 See, e.g. Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1198. 
154 Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000-01. 
155 See CAL. CONST. art. VI. § 16. 
156 See Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000-01. 
157 W.P. Rylaarsdam, Judicia/Independence: A Value Worth Protecting, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1653, 1655-56 (1993). 
158 Uelmen, supra note 16 at 1000. 
159 See, e.g., Wallace v. Zinman, 254 P. 946, 949 (Cal. 1927). 
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application of constitutional principles that apply to all exercises of 
legislative power, whether initiated or not. 160 
A. THE SINGLE-SUBJECT REQUIREMENT 
The California Constitution provides that "[a]n initiative measure 
embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or 
have any effect.,,161 The legislature and the voters added this provision 
to the state constitution in 1948. 162 The impetus for this constitutional 
amendment came from the legal establishment's reaction to the so-called 
"ham and eggs" movement spearheaded by two brothers, Lawrence and 
Willis Allen. 163 
The Allen brothers were the proponents of what they named the 
"California Bill of Rights," an initiative constitutional amendment that 
would have added 21,000 words to a constitution that was then 
composed of around 55,000. 164 The amendment addressed a dizzying 
array of topics: pensions, taxes, voting rights for Indians, gambling, 
oleomargarine, health professionals, reapportionment, surface mining, 
and fishing rights. 165 
While the petition for this amendment was circulating, the state 
legislature voted to place its own constitutional amendment on the 
ballot-the amendment containing the single-subject rule. 166 In fact, 
arguments used during the campaign for adopting the single-subject rule 
pointed specifically to the Allen brothers' "bill of rights" as a prime 
example of why a single-subject rule should be in place. 167 The voters 
adopted the single-subject rule in the election of 1948.168 The so-called 
"California Bill of Rights" however, was not so lucky; the California 
Supreme Court's decision in McFadden v. Jordan removed the initiative 
from the ballot before the people ever had a chance to vote on it. 169 
The California Supreme Court first applied the newly minted single-
subject rule in Perry v. Jordan.170 The Perry court observed that while 
160 cf Manheim and Howard. supra note 17 at 1202. 
161 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(d). 
162 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. 
REV. 936, 936 (1983). 
163 See id. at 949. 
164 Stanley Mosk, Raven and Revision, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,6 (1991). 
165 Lowenstein, supra note 162 at 950. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 950-51. 
168 Id. at 936. 
169 McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787,800 (Cal. 1948). 
170 Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1949). 
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the legislature had enacted the constitutional prohibition on initiatives 
"embracing more than one subject" the year before, such a restriction on 
laws enacted by the legislature had been present in the constitution for a 
long time. 17I At the time, article IV, section 24, read: "Every 
[legislative] act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be 
expressed in its title.,,172 As to this single-subject rule for standard 
legislative acts, the California Supreme Court had announced a test in 
Evans v. Superior Court: the rule "is to be construed liberally to uphold 
proper legislation, all parts of which are reasonably germane.,,173 
The Perry court thus applied exactly the same standard to initiated 
laws that it had to legislatively enacted laws regarding the single-subject 
requirement.174 As with acts of the legislature, the single-subject rule is 
satisfied so long as the various parts of an initiated law or constitutional 
amendment reasonably relate to each other so as to achieve the general 
object pursued. 175 Since that time, the California Supreme Court has 
applied the "reasonably germane" test whenever a statewide initiative 
has been challenged under the single-subject requirement. 176 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY REQUIREMENT 
In addition to the single-subject requirement, the California courts 
have construed the existence of another limit on the statutory initiative 
power: initiated laws must comply with the same federal and state 
constitutional standards as legislatively-enacted laws. 177 This means that 
California courts will strike down an initiative that violates an existing 
provision of either the state or the U.S. Constitution.178 
Legislature v. Deukmejian is the leading case demonstrating this 
principle. In Deukmejian the California Supreme Court held invalid an 
initiative redistricting measure as conflicting with an express 
constitutional provision that sets the rules for redrawing legislative 
districts.179 Article XXI of the California Constitution requires that the 
171 Id. at 92. 
172 Id.; the same provision is now contained in art. IV § 9. 
173 Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467,469 (Cal. 1932). 
174 See Perry, 207 P.2d at 50. 
175 Id. 
176 See, e.g. Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1289-92; Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 279-84; Fair 
Political Practices Commission v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 55 (Cal. 1979); Raven v. 
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083-85 (Cal. 1990); Senate v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1098-1105 (Cal. 
1999). 
177 Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17,27 (Cal. 1983). 
178 See id. 
179/d. at 30. 
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legislature reset the boundaries of the state's legislative districts at some 
point during the year following the federal census. 180 In 1983, Governor 
George Oeukmejian called for a special election so the people of the state 
could vote on a redistricting initiative that, if passed, would have 
redrawn the districts and repealed the redistricting statutes that the 
legislature had enacted two years before. 181 
The California Supreme Court saw this as an attempt to effect a 
second redistricting by initiative after the constitutionally mandated 
redistricting had already occurred.182 The problem with this attempt was 
that it ran afoul of the long-standing "once-a-decade" interpretation of 
article XXI. 183 The court found that the authors of the state constitution 
intended that redistricting occur immediately following each decennial 
federal census and not occur again until after the next census. 184 In 1981, 
the legislature had performed its duty under article XXI to redraw the 
boundaries of the various legislative districts in the state. 185 As a result, 
the court held that any attempt to change the districts before the 1990 
federal census had taken place was impermissible under article XXI. 186 
The initiative proponents, in attempting to evade the requirements 
of the "once-a-decade" rule, put forth what the court saw as a "novel 
theory.,,187 They argued that article XXI only operates as a limitation on 
the legislature and not on the initiative power.188 The court found itself 
puzzled by the idea that initiatives should be exempted from the same 
constitutional limitations that apply to legislatively-enacted laws. 189 The 
initiative power to propose and enact statutes is a form of legislative 
power "which otherwise would reside in the Legislature.,,190 Thus, "it 
has heretofore been considered to be no greater with respect to the nature 
and attributes of the statutes that may be enacted than that of the 
Legislature.,,191 
The California Supreme Court in Wallace v. Zinman directly 
addressed the issue of whether initiated statutes should be accorded 
180 CAL. CONST. art. XXI. 
181 See Legislature v. Deukmejian. 669 P.2d at 19. 
182 [d. at 29. 
183 See id. at 22-26. 
184/d. at 23. 
185 [d. at 21. 
186 [d. at 29. 
187/d. at 25. 
188 [d. 
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greater deference than laws enacted by the legislature. 192 The court 
unequivocally stated that initiative statutes are not entitled to greater 
constitutional status than ordinary laws: 
We do not recognize an initiative measure as having any greater 
strength or dignity than attaches to any other legislation .... It is only 
another system added to our plan of state government by a permissive 
amendment to the constitution, but it was at no time intended that such 
permissive legislation by direct vote should override the other 
safeguards of the constitution .... We have a state government with 
three departments, each to check upon the others, and it would be 
subversive of the very foundation purposes of our government to 
permit an initiative act of any type to throw out of gear our entire le?al 
mechanism. Our common sense makes us rebel at the suggestion. 19 
The California Court of Appeal followed the Deukmejian court's 
lead when deciding People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court. At issue 
in People's Advocate was an initiative known as the Legislative Reform 
Act of 1983.194 This initiative sought to make radical changes to the 
organization and procedures of the state Senate and Assembly and to 
substantially curtail the future apportioning of funds designated for their 
operation. 195 Because article IV, section 7, of the state constitution 
authorizes each house of the legislature to fashion rules for its 
proceedings, an initiative measure that purports to do the same effects an 
unconstitutional usurpation of a power explicitly bestowed upon the 
legislature. 196 
In keeping with the principle announced in Zinman that initiatives 
do not possess any privileged constitutional status, the court in People's 
Advocate accorded the initiative at issue no greater constitutional weight 
than any other statute. 197 Again, the standards applied to initiatives are 
no different from the standards applied to acts of the state legislature. 198 
Neither initiated statute nor legislative act may exceed the bounds set for 
them by the state constitution. 199 
This Comment attempts to follow the path charted in Zinman. Just 
as acts of the state legislature must comply with all applicable 
192 Zinman, 254 P. at 946. 
193 /d. at 949. 
194 People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642 eCt. App. 1986). 
195 [d. 
196 See id. at 645. 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 647. 
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constitutional provisions, so should the people's exercise of the initiative 
power be made to comply with the state constitution.2oo This should 
include the separation of powers requirement contained in article ill, 
section 3. No legitimate reason exists to exempt the initiative power 
from this important requirement, particularly in light of Zinman's 
holding that statutory initiatives are entitled to no greater constitutional 
weight merely as a result of being proposed and passed by the voters 
instead of the state legislature.201 
V. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN CALIFORNIA 
Article ill, section 3, of the California Constitution provides that 
"the powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. 
Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either 
of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.,,202 
This provision was included in the original version of the California 
Constitution, written in 1849,z03 When drafting the first California 
Constitution, the delegates followed the practice of other recently 
constituted states by lifting verbatim the language of existing state 
constitutions and inserting that language into their own,z04 
The Virginia Constitution was the first state charter created after the 
Continental Congress requested that the colonial governments write their 
own foundational documents.205 The Virginia Constitution naturally 
became the model used by other states when it came time to fashion their 
own constitutions,z°6 Thus, because Virginia had included a separation 
of powers provision in its constitution, many other states did as well.207 
California was no exception.208 The delegates to the state constitutional 
convention in 1849 relied heavily on the recently-passed constitutions of 
other states, notably Iowa.209 Iowa had, in tum, relied upon the Kentucky 
Constitution, which had relied upon the charters of the thirteen original 
states.210 
The pedigree of article ill, section 3, of the California Constitution 
200 See id. 
201 See Zinman, 254 P. at 949. 
202 CAL. CONST. art. III. § 3. 
203 Zasloff, supra note 18 at 1102. 
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can thus be traced back in an unbroken line to the founding generation.2l1 
According to the thinking of the founding generation, a government of 
separate yet interacting powers is the best way to provide simultaneously 
for the public welfare and for the liberty of each citizen.212 By diffusing 
power into distinct branches of government, the American constitutional 
republic could by design prevent abuses of governmental power. 2\3 
In keeping with the spirit of its pedigree, California courts have 
construed the separation of powers provision of the California 
Constitution as intended to prevent the concentration of governmental 
power in the hands of a single individual or groUp.214 According to the 
interpretation given it by the California courts, this provision establishes 
a system of checks and balances among the various governmental powers 
to ensure that one branch of government does not encroach unduly upon 
the province of another.215 
A. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL SEPARATION OF POWERS 
DOCTRINE 
Although the broad policy goal underlying the separation of powers 
is identical at both the state and the federal level, the means through 
which reviewing courts implement it in their respective jurisdictions are 
very different.216 In other words, state courts are free to develop alternate 
theories and interpretations of the separation of powers without being 
bound by federal separation of powers doctrine?17 Federal separation of 
powers jurisprudence can serve as persuasive and instructive authority, 
but state courts are not required to apply federal precedents when 
interpreting the separation of powers provisions found in state 
constitutions.218 The primary reason for this lies in the fact that the U.S. 
Constitution defines the powers of the various branches of the federal 
government very differently from the way that state constitutions define 
the powers of their respective branches of government. 219 
For example, the U.S. Constitution expressly vests in the executive 
211 [d. 
212 Cronin, supra note 88 at 29. 
213 See Eule, supra note 75 at 1528. 
214 California Ass 'n of Retail Tobacconists, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254. 
215 Santa Theresa Citizen Action Group v. California Energy Comm'n, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 
398 (Cl. App. 2003). 
2005). 
216 See Marine Forests Soc'y v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 P.3d 1062, 1075-77 (Cal. 
217 [d. at 1076. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. 
22
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branch the power to appoint 
Ambassadors other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
supreme court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
be established by Law?20 
In California, however, the legislature has always had power to 
appoint and remove certain officials.221 Whereas on the federal level the 
appointment of the officials listed in Article II, Section 2, is an 
exclusively executive power, in California the appointment power is 
shared by the executive branch and the state legislature.222 
Another reason that federal separation of powers jurisprudence is 
inapplicable to California is that whereas Congress under Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution may only exercise the powers that are therein 
enumerated,223 state legislatures have plenary lawmaking authority.224 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution is a grant of power to Congress.225 As a 
result, each congressional act must be anchored in one of Congress's 
enumerated powers.226 State constitutions, by contrast, are not grants of 
power but rather affirmative limits on a police power that is presumed to 
be plenary.227 Thus, each act of a state legislature is valid if not 
specifically prohibited by the state constitution.228 
The fact that only state legislatures have plenary lawmaking 
authority, combined with the difference in the powers granted to each 
branch under the U.S. Constitution on the one hand and the California 
Constitution on the other, calls for a different doctrinal approach from 
that used in the federal context when analyzing issues arising under 
article III, section 3, of the California Constitution.229 
B. THE CORE FuNCTION DOCTRINE 
California courts have interpreted article III, section 3, as defining a 
core zone of constitutionally delegated power for each branch of 
220 U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2. 
221 See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1084. 
222 1d. 
223 See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. 
224 Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1078. 




229 See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1076. 
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government that may not be encroached upon or infringed by any other 
branch in such a way as to defeat or materially impair the exercise of that 
core power?30 As a corollary to this basic principle, each branch may act 
in ways that significantly affect the activities of the others so long as the 
prohibited defeat or material impairment does not OCCUr.231 In other 
words, the separation of powers does not require a hermetic sealing-off 
of each branch from the others; instead, it establishes an interdependent 
system of checks and balances containing distinct yet porous boundaries 
between the zones of power delegated to each branch of state 
government.232 
1. Each Branch May Affect the Others 
A number of decisions illustrate the flexibility that the core function 
doctrine incorporates into California's tripartite system of government. 
For example, in Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, the California 
Supreme Court held that the legislature does not violate the separation of 
powers whenever it enacts regulations concerning an area over which the 
courts have "inherent power.,,233 
The controversy in County of Mendocino arose when the legislature, 
in an attempt to help local governments meet their budgetary obligations, 
enacted an urgency statute that gave counties the power to designate 
unpaid "furlough days" on which the local court "shall not be in 
session.,,234 The superior court, ignoring the county's designation, 
ordered its employees to report for work on two of the designated 
furlough days.235 When the county refused to pay the employees for 
those days at work, the superior court filed suit alleging that the county 
lacked the constitutional authority to designate days when the court will 
not be in session?36 
The California Supreme Court upheld the authority of the county to 
designate unpaid furlough days on which the court will not be in 
session.237 The county had received this authority from the urgency 
230 Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 16 (Cal. 2002); Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 538; 
Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d 1046, 1054 (Cal. 1996). 
231 Manduley, 41 P.3d at 16; Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 538; County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d 
at 1051. 
232 In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49,55 (Cal. 1998). 
233 County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at 1054. 
234 [d. at 1048. 
235 Id. at 1049. 
236 [d. 
237 [d. at 1059. 
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statute passed by the legislature.238 The legislature, in turn, has the 
constitutional authority to 
adopt reasonable regulations affecting a court's inherent powers or 
functions, so long as the legislation does not "defeat" or "materially 
impair" a court's exercise of its constitutional power or the fulfillment 
of its constitutional function. 239 
In light of the long-standing practice by the legislature of designating 
court holidays--days on which the court is not in session-the supreme 
court found no reason to conclude that the county's action defeated or 
materially impaired the superior court's exercise of the judicial power.240 
2. The Powers Are Not Always Distinct 
Under the core function doctrine, executive and judicial officers 
may "exercise quasi-legislative authority in establishing general policies 
and promulgating general rules for the governing of affairs within their 
respective spheres" without offending the separation of powers.241 Thus, 
in In re Attorney Discipline System, the California Supreme Court held 
that it's assessment of an additional fee on members of the state bar to 
fund the state's attorney- discipline system did not impermissibly usurp 
the legislative power of appropriation.242 Because the judicial power 
includes inherent authority over the area of attorney discipline, 
assessment of the fee was within the court's power even though it did, in 
some sense, replicate a legislative function. 243 
Similarly, the court in Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal 
Commission held that provisions of the Coastal Act vesting the power to 
appoint members of the Coastal Commission in the Senate Rules 
Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly did not violate the 
separation of powers because under the state's constitution, the 
appointment power is not the sole province of the executive?44 
Therefore, exercise by another branch of the appointment power does not 
invade any "core zone" of executive function if such exercise leaves 
intact the governor's exercise of the appointment power.245 
238 Id. at 1048. 
239 Id. at 1055. 
240 See id. at 1059. 
241 In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 57. 
242 Id. at 52. 
243/d. 
244 Marine Forests, 133 P.3d at 1062. 
245 /d. at 1088. 
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The proscribed defeat or material impairment of the governor's 
appointment power did not result from the Coastal Act's vesting of 
appointment power in members of the legislature for a number of 
reasons.246 First, the Coastal Commission is an autonomous regulatory 
agency.247 It is not a close and indispensable arm of the executive such 
that legislative appointment of its members would trample upon "an 
exclusively executive prerogative.,,248 
Second, as an autonomous regulatory agency the Commission 
routinely exercises "a broad variety of functions, including both quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial functions as well as more traditional 
executive functions.,,249 The fact that the Commission does more than 
merely "execute" the laws casts doubt upon the claim that the executive 
branch should have the sole authority to appoint its members.25o 
Finally, the Coastal Act itself provides sufficient procedural 
safeguards to ensure that the Commission operates without undue 
interference by the legislature.251 The presence of such procedural 
safeguards greatly reduces the possibility that the legislature will defeat 
or materially impair the Coastal Commission's functions through 
intrusive oversight or contro1.252 
Marine Forests illustrates that the core function doctrine is a rather 
liberal standard. The doctrine allows for a substantial degree of 
"mixing" governmental powers. It recognizes that one branch may 
imitate the functions of another so long as the "core zone" of each is not 
completely subsumed.253 
3. What May Not Be Done 
Implicit in this formulation of the core function doctrine is the idea 
that one branch may unconstitutionally reach too far into the realm of 
another.254 Thus, California courts 
have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that either accrete 
to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate 





250 See id. 
251 [d. at 109l. 
252 See id. 
253 Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 539. 
254 See id. 
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another coordinate Branch.255 
In People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) the California Supreme 
Court ruled that a state law granting prosecutors a veto over a trial 
court's order that a criminal defendant participate in a pretrial diversion 
program was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of 
powers.256 The court found that the diversion order was a form of 
sentencing, and as such it was an exercise of judicial power entitled to 
protection under article III, section 3.257 
By contrast, the California Supreme Court in Sledge v. Superior 
Court held that the determination of whether a criminal defendant was 
eligible for pre-trial diversion is not an exercise of judicial power.258 
Therefore a prosecutor could constitutionally refuse to initiate diversion 
proceedings since that decision invaded no protected area of judicial 
authority.259 
In the context of criminal proceedings, 
the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislative branch from 
granting prosecutors the authority, after charges have been filed, to 
control the legislatively specified sentencing choices available to a 
court.260 
On the other hand, statutes granting discretion to prosecutors to make 
decisions before filing charges do not violate the separation of powers 
merely because such decisions inevitably affect "the dispositional 
options available to the court.,,261 
The California Supreme Court has also held that under the 
separation of powers a court may not directly order the legislature to 
enact an appropriation law.262 It may, however, require that funds 
already appropriated be paid out to satisfy a valid judgment against a 
state agency.263 
The court in County of Mendocino gave a good general overview of 
the limits on the exercise of each power: 
255 ld. at 538. 
256 People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), 520 P.2d 405, 406 (Cal. 1974). 
257 See id. at 412. 
258 Sledge v. Superior Court, 520 P.2d 412, 414 (Cal. 1974). 
259 See id. 
260 Manduley, 41 P.3d at \3 (emphasis in original). 
261 1d. 
262 Mandel v. Myers, 629 P.2d 935, 941 (Cal. 1981). 
263 1d. 
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this doctrine [i.e. the separation of powers] unquestionably places 
'. limits upon the actions of each branch with respect to the other 
branches. The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by. the 
Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies 
embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the 
choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a 
legislative function. The executive branch, in expending public funds, 
may not disregard legislatively prescribed directives and limits 
pertaining to the use of such funds. And the Legislature may not 
undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the 
courts and resolved by final judicial judgment. 264 
The doctrine of the separation of powers in California operates to 
prevent the undue accumulation of power in the hands of a single branch 
by maintaining distinct yet porous boundaries between the executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary.265 When one branch defeats or materially 
impairs the ability of another branch to perform its constitutionally 
vested function, the former branch has violated the separation of 
powers.266 The powers of each branch may to an extent be mixed, but 
one branch may not completely subsume the powers of another?67 
VI. THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE CHECK ON THE STATUTORY 
lNITIA TIVE POWER 
When the core function doctrine is applied to the initiative power, 
the provisions of the state constitution defining the initiative powe?68 
appear to conflict with the doctrine of the separation of powers as it is 
expressed in Article III Section 3.269 The lack of a legislative check on 
exercises of the initiative power amounts to a complete arrogation of the 
legislative power. This conflict is created by an ambiguity in the 
constitutional language that defines the initiative power.270 Applying 
traditional methods of constitutional construction to this ambiguity yields 
the conclusion that some form of legislative check on the initiative power 
must exist if the separation of powers is to be respected and maintained. 
The intent underlying the creation of the initiative power was not to 
completely displace the state legislature as a lawmaking body but rather 
264 County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at 1051 (citations omitted). 
265 In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 55. 
266 County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at 1054. 
267 See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1074. 
268 See CAL. CaNST. art. IV. § I; see also CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a). 
269 Cf Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1202-03. 
270 See CAL. CONST. art. IV. § I; see also CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a). 
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to merely provide a check on its exercise of the legislative power.271 The 
lack of any meaningful involvement by the legislature in the initiative 
process renders it wholly inferior as a lawmaking bod/72 in derogation 
of separation of powers principles. 
The core function doctrine requires the existence of a central zone 
of legislative power that may be exercised only by the state legislature.273 
The doctrine precludes using the initiative power to defeat or materially 
impair the legislature's exercise of its core powers.274 The doctrine 
likewise requires that the initiative power remain free from defeating or 
materially impairing interference by the state legislature.275 
The constitutional legislative power is generally defined as the 
ability to pass laws, levy taxes, make appropriations, and determine the 
legislative policy of the state.276 The state legislature may do each of 
these things with an expectation that the executive and the judiciary will 
not unduly impede its efforts in these areas?77 The voters of the state, 
through the initiative power, may also pass laws, levy taxes, and make 
appropriations with a comparable expectation that their decisions will not 
be thwarted by the efforts of the other three branches of government. 
However, while the people of the state possess a check on their 
legislators in the form of the initiative process, the door does not swing 
both ways. The state legislature is powerless in the face of the people's 
exercise of the "reserved" initiative power. The legislature has no say in 
what laws are proposed and which ones are passed by initiative.278 In 
addition, initiated laws are generally beyond the legislature's ability to 
amend or repeal. 279 The result is that the legislature's exercise of 
legislative power is inferior to the voters' exercise of that same power.280 
The legislature has no peculiar lawmaking province of its own-it makes 
laws that exist at the pleasure of those who exercise the initiative 
power?81 Such a complete arrogation of the legislature's ability to pass 
laws is repugnant to the principle of the separation of powers. 
The conflict between the separation of powers provision and those 
271 See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. 
272 See Rossi, 889 P,2d at 574. 
273 See Marine Forests. 113 PJd at 1074. 
274 See id. 
275 See id. 
276 Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 539. 
277 See County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d at lOS!. 
278 See supra notes 48-74 and accompanying text. 
279 See CAL CONST. art. II. § 10(c). 
280 See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 574. 
281 See id. 
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provisions relating to the initiative power derives from an ambiguity in 
the relevant language. Article IV, section 1, vests the legislative power 
of the state in the Senate and Assembly, but it also provides that the 
people "reserve" to themselves the initiative power.282 Article II, section 
8(a), defines the initiative power as the ability to propose and pass 
statutory laws and constitutional amendments?83 
The ambiguity lies in the fact that the limits of this "reservation" are 
not specified.284 Is the reservation complete or merely partial? Do the 
people reserve to themselves only a portion of the state's legislative 
power, or is the reservation wholesale? 
Even though the constitutional language provides no guidance on 
this question, the decision in People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
discussed above, militates against an interpretation of article IV, section 
1, that the people "reserve" to themselves the whole of the state's 
legislative power. 285 The court stated, 
the petitioners [in the case at bar] seek to trade upon an assumption 
about the extent of the legislative power of the people. They assume 
that the initiative power includes the whole of the legislative power .. 
. . The assumption is incorrect .... Such reserved powers [of initiative 
and referendum] are exclusively specified in article II, section 8, and 
are limited to that which has been specifically delegated.286 
This passage suggests that a portion of the state's legislative power exists 
that may not be exercised by initiative; if that is the case, then the 
"unreserved" portion of legislative power should be entitled to protection 
under the separation of powers provision of the state constitution. 
Where ambiguity exists, recourse must be had to settled standards 
of judicial construction in order to resolve it.287 The cardinal goal of 
judicial construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the 
lawmaking body.288 In addition, constitutional provisions should if 
possible be construed so that conflict or repugnancy is avoided?89 
As noted above, the intent behind the creation of the initiative 
power was only to provide the people of California a check on the 
282 CAL. CONST. art. IV. § 1 
283 CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8(a). 
284 See CAL. CONST. art. IV. § I. 
285 See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text. 
286 People's Advocate, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 646. 
287 See Brown v. San Francisco, 266 P.2d 951, 953 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). 
288 Richmond v. Shasta Cmty. Servs. Dist., 83 P.3d 518, 522 (Cal. 2004). 
289 People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 268 P.2d 723, 732 (Cal. 1954). 
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activities of the state legislature.29o The creators of the initiative did not 
intend to thereby replace the Senate and Assembly as the chief organ for 
the exercise of legislative power?91 As such, an interpretation of article 
IV, section 1, and its language of "reservation" that assumes a complete 
rather than partial reservation would contravene the intent of the 
lawmakers who adopted the initiative process in 1911.292 Interpreting the 
"reservation" as only partial would not only avoid repugnancy with the 
separation of powers provision but would also have the salutary effect of 
implementing the original intent of the creators of the initiative 
process?93 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The purpose behind the creation of the initiative power was to 
provide the people of the state with an effective check on the actions of 
their elected representatives?94 It was not to create a second and more 
powerful avenue for the exercise of the state's legislative power.295 The 
initiative power gives the people a useful check on the legislature, but 
under the current constitution the legislature possesses no check on the 
initiative power.296 The result is that the initiative power exercises a 
lawmaking function that is superior to that of the legislature?97 Such 
superiority is repugnant to the doctrine of the separation of powers as it 
is expressed in article III, section 3, of the state constitution. Even 
though the constitution vests the state's legislative power in two different 
entities-the legislature and the initiative process-the separation of 
powers requires that each entity be allowed to perform its core function 
without completely arrogating the constitutionally delegated powers of 
the other. 298 
At the heart of this repugnancy lies the aforementioned wholesale 
exclusion of the state legislature from the initiative process.299 By 
placing initiated laws beyond the power of the legislature to amend or 
repeal, the state constitution violates one of its own precepts-the 
290 See supra notes 104- \08 and accompanying text. 
291 See id. 
292 See id. 
293 See id. 
294 See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. 
295 See id. 
296 See CAL. CONST. art. II. § 8. 
297 See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 574. 
298 See Marine Forests, 113 P.3d at 1087. 
299 Cj Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1202-03. 
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separation of powers. 3OO This lack of a repeal or amendment power 
renders the state legislature a subordinate rather than coordinate branch 
of government vis-a-vis the initiative power.301 This article III, section 3, 
does not allow. All branches of government must operate on a level 
playing field if the principle of the separation of powers is to be 
respected and maintained.302 
In 1996 the California Constitution Revision Commission 
recommended to the state legislature that the initiative process be 
reformed so as to meaningfully include the legislature in the process: 
The initiative process should not exclude the legislature from the 
lawmaking process. The legislature is a lawmaking body, and it has 
experience in making laws and considering their outcomes. The 
legislature should-at a minimum-have a role in the initiative 
process to ensure that initiatives are well-written and meet the 
purposes for which they are designed. Additionally, once an initiative 
statute is enacted, there should be a mechanism for evaluating its 
impact. If an initiative statute is not meeting its intended purpose, or 
if it is having unexpected consequences, the legislature and the 
governor should be able to revise the law. 303 
Such reforms would bring the California initiative process into 
alignment not only with separation of powers principles but also with its 
sister initiative states. California is one of the only initiative states that 
does not allow for legislative amendment or repeal of initiated laws.304 
The special election of 2005 demonstrated the propensity of 
California's political establishment to rely on the initiative process as an 
engine for political gain. The root of this propensity lies not in the fount 
of political ambition, but rather in the constitutional provisions that give 
the people, through the initiative process, a superior lawmaking power.305 
The center of politics will naturally gravitate toward the greatest source 
of political power; the initiative, as the most powerful form of 
lawmaking in the state, clearly has taken on this role.306 As long as the 
initiative process occupies a superior constitutional position, it will 
appeal to those who wish to realize their agendas directly without having 
to navigate the often "difficult and tortuous" maze of the state 
300 Cf id. 
301 See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 574. 
302 See In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 55. 
303 Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1189. 
304 Id. at 1197. 
305 See supra notes 131-145 and accompanying text. 
306 See supra notes 109-123 and accompanying text. 
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I . I 307 egIs ature. 
Calls for initiative reform began soon after the initiative process was 
created in 1911.308 This Comment adds to the chorus of those who see 
problems with the way the initiative in California is currently constituted 
by focusing on a foundational principle of all republican government-
the separation of powers-and by posing and answering the question of 
the effect that this principle should properly have on the initiative power. 
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308 See Manheim and Howard, supra note 17 at 1188. 
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